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The neoclassical growth model is extended to allow for mobile labor. Following a negative shock to
a small economy's capital stock, capital and labor frictions effect an equilibrium transition path during
which wages remain below their steady-state level. Outmigration directly contributes to faster income
convergence but also creates a disincentive for gross capital formation. The net result is that across a wide
range of calibrations, the speed of income convergence is relatively insensitive to the degree of labor
mobility.
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How does labor mobility aﬀect income convergence? Intuitively, individuals￿ moving in
search of higher wages might be expected to increase the speed at which per capita income
is equilibrated across regions. But empirical research has failed to ￿nd a link between labor
mobility and the speed of income convergence. What the intuition misses is that the exit
of labor from poorer economies lowers the return to capital there and so slows gross capital
formation. Extending the neoclassical growth framework to allow for labor mobility, this
paper argues that the disincentive eﬀect of labor ￿ows on gross capital formation roughly
oﬀsets their direct eﬀect on capital intensity. Numerical results across a wide range of
calibrations show that the resulting net eﬀect of labor mobility on the speed of income
convergence is small.
The extended neoclassical growth framework developed herein premises a large inte-
grated macroeconomy made up of numerous small open economies across which there is
high labor mobility. In a long run steady state, capital intensities and hence wages must be
equal across these small constituent economies. But following a negative shock to a single
constituent economy￿s capital stock, frictions ￿ in the form of an installation cost to capital
proportional to the rate of gross investment and an analogous moving cost proportional to
t h er a t eo fn e tm i g r a t i o n￿e ﬀect an extended equilibrium transition path during which
local wages will be below their steady-state level. Rather than labor mobility, the main de-
terminant of the speed of income convergence is the degree of capital mobility as measured
by the cost of installing capital.
A ￿rst subsidiary result is that the speed of income convergence varies considerably
in a neighborhood very close to the system steady state; hence measuring the speed of
convergence right at the steady state based on a linearization proves a misleading metric.
A second subsidiary result is that steady-state population density is history dependent; such
hysteresis follows from consumption smoothing and does not depend on any non-neoclassical
assumptions such as increasing returns to scale. Both a highly varying speed of convergence
and a history-dependent steady state follow generically from a growth system with multiple
state (i.e., non￿jumping) variables.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature including empirical
estimates of the link between labor mobility and income convergence. Section 3 developsthe extended neoclassical growth framework. Section 4 discusses the qualitative features
of the time paths of population, income, and housing prices following a negative shock to
a single constituent economy￿s capital stock; across a wide range of calibrations, varying
t h ed e g r e eo fl a b o rm o b i l i t yh a sal a r g ee ﬀect on the time paths of population and housing
prices but only a small eﬀect on the time path of income. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background
A natural starting point is to formally de￿ne ￿the speed of convergence￿:
Λ(logy(t) − logy∗ (t)) ≡
− d
dt (logy(t) − logy∗ (t))
logy(t) − logy∗ (t)
Here, the numerator measures the rate at which income, y(t), moves towards its contem-
porary steady-state value, y∗ (t). The denominator measures the distance of income from
this steady state. As de￿ned, the speed of convergence will be positive so long as income is
indeed moving towards its steady state.
In the special case where the speed of convergence does not depend on income￿s distance









Assuming logy∗ to be measured by x0β, a linear combination of exogenous attributes,
then by regressing growth rates on initial income and a vector of such attributes, a constant
speed of convergence will be measured by the coeﬃcient on initial income (making an
adjustment for the fact that the above equations hold in continuous time whereas cross-
s e c t i o n a lg r o w t he m p i r i c sa r eb a s e do nd i s c r e t et i m eo b s e r v a t i o n s ) .B a r r oa n dS a l a - i - M a r t i n
(1991, 1992, 1995) compare cross-sectional income growth regressions from several diﬀerent
geographies including U.S. states, European regions, and Japanese prefectures. Presumably
the degree of labor mobility varies between these geographies. But the estimated speeds
of convergence from the growth regressions are nearly identical across these geographies
and are approximately the same as the estimated speed of convergence from cross-country
growth regressions (approximately 2 percent per year). Looking across U.S. counties over
the period 1960 to 1990, Rappaport (1999a) obtains similar estimates for the speed of
income convergence.1






2One explanation for the similar convergence estimates is simply that (1) is misspeci￿ed.
For instance, the numerical results below show the speed of convergence to vary greatly as
a small open economy approaches its steady state. Other problems with interpreting the
coeﬃcient on initial income as measuring the speed of convergence include endogeneity of the
controls measuring steady-state income, endogeneity of initial income, and mismeasurement
of initial income. (Islam, 1985; Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort, 1996; Ades and Glaeser, 1994.
For a more general critique of cross-sectional growth empirics, see Durlauf and Quah, 1998).
Using a high frequency panel technique which allows the speed of convergence to vary across
observations, Evans and Karras (1996) and Evans (1997) indeed ￿nd substantially higher
speeds of convergence for U.S. states than for a group of 54 countries.
Barro and Sala-i-Martin argue that the lack of eﬀect of labor mobility on convergence
speed is consistent with neoclassical growth theory based on empirical estimates which show
only a very small response of labor ￿ows to wage diﬀerentials; essentially, labor mobility does
not aﬀect income convergence because labor is not very mobile. Looking at the relationship
between net migration and initial wage levels for U.S. states for each decade, 1900 through
1990, Barro and Sala-i-Martin￿s highest estimate of labor mobility suggests that a 25 percent
wage diﬀerential is necessary to induce a 1 percent rate of net migration.
Other researchers ￿nd an even smaller response of net migration to wage diﬀerentials.
Hatton and Williamson (1998), for instance, estimate the sensitivity to relative real wages
of emigration rates from various European countries during the late 19th and early 20th
centuries; their baseline estimate suggests that it took more than a 400 percent wage diﬀer-
ential to induce a 1 percent rate of emigration (Table 3.3, column 1); their highest esimate
of labor mobility ￿ from Ireland over the period 1878 to 1913 ￿ suggests that it took a 53
percent real wage diﬀerential to induce a 1 percent rate of emigration (Table 5.2, column 2).
Blanchard and Katz (1995) examining employment growth across U.S. states over the pe-
riod 1950 to 1990 and Rappaport (1999a) examining net migration across U.S. counties over
t h ep e r i o d1 9 6 0t o1 9 9 0￿nd no consistent relationship between wage levels and population
￿ows.
But the failure to ￿nd a strong relationship between wage levels and population ￿ows










∗ (t) − logy (t)) +
d
dty∗(t)
y∗(t) . Doing so is essentially the
same as estimating (1) and then making the transformation λ = −
log(1−￿ λT)
T where ￿ λ is the negative of the
linear coeﬃcient on initial income.
3does not necessarily imply that labor is immobile. Rather, theory suggests that in addition
to income, population ￿ows are also driven by quality-of-life considerations (Rosen, 1979;
Roback, 1982; Gyourko and Tracy, 1989, 1991; Rappaport, 1999b). Observed wage diﬀer-
ences may be due to a locality￿s being away from its long run steady-state capital intensity;
or they may simply be compensating for diﬀering quality of life (e.g., due to weather, nat-
ural amenities, etc.). In the latter case, even with perfect labor mobility we would observe
no correlation between wage levels and population ￿ows.
Moreover, even after controlling for quality of life, theory suggests that population ￿ows
are driven by relative real wealth levels rather than relative wages. Wages denominated in
terms of tradable output exaggerate diﬀerences in relative real wealth in at least three
diﬀerent ways. First is that individuals￿ consumption bundles include local nontradables
(e.g., housing services) whose price level is likely to be proportional to local wages. Second is
the convergence over time of wage levels as documented in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991).
Third is that relative real wealth includes not just labor wealth but also asset wealth; the
higher the asset wealth of individuals, the lower the relative real wealth diﬀerence for a
given diﬀerence in relative labor wealth.
In practice, of course, neither quality of life nor relative real wealth is observable. Hence
the use of supposed exogenous attributes to measure the former and relative wages to proxy
for the latter. Such a combination introduces still another downward bias in estimating the
response of labor ￿ows to income diﬀerentials. Attributes included to measure quality of life
may also aﬀect an economy￿s productivity; for instance, a coastal location may provide both
recreational opportunities as well as inexpensive transport. Relative productivity levels, in
turn, presumably underlie long run wealth diﬀerences. And so to the extent that observed
wages fail to capture true wealth diﬀerences, the population response to wealth diﬀerences
may be captured in part by a partial correlation of population ￿ows with attributes meant
to control for quality of life.
That it takes a 25 percent real wealth diﬀerential to induce a one percent rate of net
migration across U.S. states seems implausible. And if labor is indeed reasonably mobile
across localities, the Barro Sala-i-Martin explanation for the similar estimates of convergence
speed across the various geographies falls short. Reinforcing this puzzle is the theoretical
work of Braun (1993), which shows that near a steady state the speed of income convergence
will equal the speed of population convergence (i.e., the speed at which population converges
4towards its steady state); hence we should expect the speed of income convergence to be
directly proportional to the degree of labor mobility.
The disincentive eﬀect of mobile labor on gross capital formation resolves the puzzle.
The explanation is consistent with Braun￿s results in that the asymptotic speed of income
convergence is indeed directly proportional to the degree of labor mobility. However, both
theoretical and numerical results show that the asymptotic speed of convergence will hold
only in a neighborhood extremely close to the system steady state. Beyond this neighbor-
hood, a data generating process of the form (1) is essentially irrelevant.
3 A Neoclassical Theory of Local Growth
Extending the neoclassical growth model (Ramsey, 1928; Cass, 1965; Koopmans, 1965) to
allow for labor mobility is essentially to model local economic growth. ￿Local￿ is meant to
connote a small open economy within a larger integrated macroeconomy characterized by
high labor mobility. A locality may correspond to a city or region within a nation state or
even, as perhaps suggested by the European Union, to a nation state itself. Being small, a
locality can take tradable output prices and interest rates as given; conditions within the
locality itself determine local nontradable prices, local wage levels, and local population.
In a long run steady state, each of the localities which together make up the integrated
macroeconomy must oﬀer optimizing individuals an identical level of utility and optimizing
￿rms an identical level of pro￿ts. This condition is exactly the same as the identifying
assumption underlying the compensating wage diﬀerential literature (Rosen, 1979; Roback,
1982; Gyourko and Tracy, 1989, 1991). But frictions to labor and capital mobility eﬀect an
extended equilibrium transition path during which rents will be associated with living and
owning installed capital in certain localities relative to others. Herein I will focus on the
dynamics experienced by a single such locality while assuming that the integrated rest-of-
world economy is already at its steady state. The dynamics by which the overall system
reaches a steady state thus remains an important question for future research.
A ￿nal change to the standard neoclassical setup is that, in addition to consumption
of tradable output, individual utility is augmented to include consumption of a locally pro-
duced nontradable good. Herein, I simply assume a constant ￿ow supply of the nontradable
good; a natural interpretation is that it corresponds to housing services. To the extent that
5production of the tradable good is capital intensive relative to production of the nontradable
good, nontradable consumption lessens the incentive for emigration from capital poor local-
ities. Equally important, the inclusion of a ￿xed resource such as housing services captures
that a locality is limited in scope; without a ￿xed resource constraint, all individuals and
￿rms within the integrated macroeconomy end up locating in the locality with the highest
productivity.
Various elements of the extended neoclassical growth theory already exist within the
economics literature. In particular, Mueser and Graves (1995) contend that the instanta-
neous equating of utility and pro￿ts across localities assumed by static theories of locational
choice is unrealistic; instead, they argue that population and ￿rm locational movements
must be proportional to utility and pro￿td i ﬀerentials. More formally, Braun (1993) intro-
duces labor mobility into the neoclassical growth framework by assuming that labor ￿ows
are proportional to the diﬀerence in the net present value of labor income.
Though straightforward, the current model is a challenge to present due to the large
number of associated variables and equations. Herein I highlight just the setup and the re-
sults; all derivations are available upon request. The remainder of this section is divided into
seven subsections: individual utility functions and behavior, ￿rm production functions and
behavior, land price determination, characteristics of the integrated macroeconomy steady
state, the decision by individuals to migrate, transitional dynamics, and the characteristics
of the locality steady state.
3.1 Individuals
I assume a small open economy, i, inhabited by a continuum of individuals with collective
mass Li(t). These individuals need not be identical; but if they are not, I must adopt
a structure suﬃcient to allow for the admittance of a representative local agent. Herein,
such structure is indeed present as are assumptions that insure that all locally-residing
individuals are identical; per capita variables can thus be interpreted as pertaining either
to a representative agent or to all local individuals.
Ak e yd i ﬀerence from the standard neoclassical framework is that in addition to the
consumption of private output goods, individuals also derive utility from the consumption




((1 − ζ)log(ci (s)) + ζ log(ni (s)))e−ρ(s−t)ds (2)
6As in the neoclassical model, individuals face an instantaneous asset accumulation con-
straint. To ease exposition, I assume absentee landlords. While such an assumption clearly
maps poorly to actual local housing ownership, relaxing it just reinforces the present sys-
tem￿s dynamics. With the output good as numeraire and pi(t) as the rental price of housing
services, asset accumulation is given by,
d
dt
assetsi (t)=r • assetsi (t)+wi (t) − ci (t) − pi (t)ni (t)( 3 )
Individuals face the lifetime budget constraint that the net present value of their output
and housing-service consumption not exceed their current wealth which is itself the sum of
their asset wealth and the net present value of their wages.
Z ∞
t
(ci (s)+pi (t)ni (s))e−r(s−t) ds ≤ total wealthi (t)( 4 )
total wealthi (t) ≡ assetsi(t)+l a bo rwealthi (t)




Setting up and solving for individuals￿ optimal behavior, at any point in time they will
devote the fraction ρ of their total wealth on current consumption; of this, they will spend
the fraction (1 − ζ) on the tradable output good and the remaining fraction ζ on housing
services. The actual quantity of housing services consumed depends on its rental price, the
level of which will be determined endogenously.





The additive separable utility form in (2) along with the optimal output and housing
consumption functions, (5a) and (5b), allow for an easy decomposition of individuals￿ life-
time utility into a function, f(•), whose arguments are exogenous to locality i,a l o n gw i t h
elements that depend separably on individuals￿ wealth and the time path of local housing
rental prices.







=f ( ρ,ζ,r)+Uwealth,i (t)+Uprice,i (t)( 6 b )
Since the economy-wide adding up constraint that the sum of individuals￿ asset wealth
must equal the aggregate capital stock does not apply to our locality, it becomes necessary
7to track the evolution of local asset wealth. Assuming for the moment no eﬀect on mean
asset wealth from migration into or out of the locality, (3), (5a) and (5b) imply that per
capita asset wealth evolves according to,
d
dt
assetsi (t)=wi (t)+( r − ρ)assetsi (t) − ρ • labor wealthi (t)( 7 )
As discussed below, I assume that anyone migrating into locality i has the same contempo-
rary asset wealth as the current mean in i which implies that (7) will hold in equilibrium.2
3.2 Firms
Within the locality are a number of ￿rms, each with access to a constant-returns-to-scale
(CRS) production function. As CRS implies an indeterminate ￿rm size, I write instead the
aggregate local production function,






Ai(t)a n dx respectively capture locality-speci￿c total productivity and the economy-wide
rate of exogenous labor-augmenting technological progress. For the purpose of modeling
income convergence, nothing is lost by assuming identical total factor productivity across
localities and so henceforth I will drop the corresponding ￿i￿ subscript.
Output can be rewritten in intensive form based on the number of ￿eﬀective￿ labor
units as,3
￿ yi (t)=A(t) b ki (t)
α (9)
A ￿rm￿s objective is to maximize the net present value of its pro￿ts. Along the lines
of Abel (1982) and Hayashi (1982), I assume an adjustment cost to installing capital. In
particular, I specialize the average cost of installing capital to be a linear function of the
rate of gross investment, bK
2
Ii(t)
Ki(t). The parameter bK captures the magnitude of the capital
installation cost. Letting bK go to zero captures a world in which capital can be costlessly
2The main importance of asset wealth is its role in determining local housing prices as shown in (11)
below. Given the homothetic speci￿cation of utility in (2), what matters for housing prices is mean local
asset wealth. Allowing for individuals with diﬀerent levels of asset wealth, the evolution of mean asset wealth
is the same as in (7) along with the addition of a term that captures the diﬀerence between current mean
asset wealth and the asset wealth of current migrants.
3In general, lower case variables are meant to connote the per capita normalization of aggregate levels
and ￿hatted￿ variables, the normalization by the level of labor-augmenting technological progress, e
xt.
8installed and uninstalled. Firms face the dynamic constraint that the change in their level
of capital stock is just the sum of their level of gross investment less capital depreciation.
















Ii(t)+qK,i (t) • (Ii (t) − δKi (t))
The two choice variables are the ￿rms￿ level of employment, Li(t), and their level of gross
investment, Ii(t).4 The co-state variable, qK,i(t), captures the current shadow value of the
marginal unit of installed capital. That the production function, (8), is CRS and that the
installation cost function depends only on the ratio
Ii(t)
Ki(t) together imply that this ￿marginal￿
q in fact equals ￿average￿ q, the ratio of the value of total installed capital to its uninstalled
replacement cost (Hayashi, 1982). The solution to (10) is standard and so is omitted.
3.3 Housing Price Determination
Local housing services are assumed to ￿ow at the ￿xed aggregate rate, Ni(t).5 With housing-
service supply permanently ￿xed and population instantaneously ￿xed, mean per capita
housing-service consumption, ni(t), must equal Ni
Li(t). The current rental price of housing
services, pi(t), is just the price which realizes this level of housing-service demand. Using
(5b) and the de￿nition of total wealth, the price of housing services which clears the market




Li (t) • (assetsi (t)+l a bo rwealthi (t)) (11)
4Note that as expressed in (10), these are in fact aggregate locality-i variables. Given the indeterminacy
of scale associated with CRS production functions, the distinction is immaterial. Also, given the assumption
that the local labor market clears, Li(t) is predetermined; what is not predetermined is the wage that will
make ￿rms willing to employ Li(t)u n i t so fl a b o r .
5More realistically, housing services might be supposed to be produced using a locality￿s ￿xed supply
of land combined with various amounts of other intermediate inputs. The inclusion of a housing-service
production function is a priority for future research; for the moment the justi￿cation for a ￿xed supply of
housing services is that it captures that housing-service production above some threshold level is doubtlessly
characterized by a very high marginal cost.
9T h es a l e sp r i c eo fh o u s i n gs e r v i c e sc a nt h e nb ec a l c u l a t e da st h en e tp r e s e n tv a l u eo ft h e





3.4 Integrated Macroeconomy Steady State
In contrast to locality i , the remaining rest-of-world economy is assumed to be in its long
run steady state. That locality i is small and the rest of the world is large allows for such
a dichotomy. The row steady state is characterized by standard neoclassical results for a
closed economy. Net borrowing among row individuals is zero and so mean row asset wealth
must exactly equal the value of row installed capital, assetsrow (t)=qK,row krow(t). The
interest rate which eﬀects such an equilibrium is given by the sum of individuals rate of
time preference and the rate of technological progress, r = ρ + x. The equilibrium shadow
value of capital, qK,row, is exactly that which induces a rate of investment consistent with
a constant level of capital per eﬀective worker:
qK,row =1+( x + δ) bK (12)
The constancy in the steady state of system variables when normalized by the level of
technology implies that each of these grows at the exogenous rate of technological progress





















3.5 The Decision to Migrate
Analogous to the installation cost associated with capital investment, I assume a labor
mobility friction proportional to net population ￿ow rates. To motivate this, consider
rental prices for one-way do-it-yourself moving trucks. Supposing a net ￿ow of individuals
from East to West, demand for rental trucks will be high in the East while their supply will
be high in the West. The higher the net ￿ow west, the higher westbound prices need to
be to equilibrate supply and demand. Conversely, companies may be willing to subsidize
eastbound movers in order to redeploy their ￿eets. It is hard to imagine such moving prices
eﬀecting large frictions, and so the calibrations below will show results for net migration
frictions which are ￿very small￿.
10Frictions proportional to the rate of net migration might arise from several other
sources. For instance, relaxing the assumption of a ￿xed ￿ow supply of housing services,
housing stock could be modeled with an installation cost exactly the same as that for
physical capital. While such a setup would admit discrete in￿nite-rate population ￿ows im-
mediately following shocks, additional net population ￿ows would accompany transitional
expansions and contractions of housing stock. Endogenizing the labor mobility friction is a
priority for future research.
Of course, numerous other labor mobility frictions may arise which are not proportional
to net ￿ows. Large gross ￿ows may increase costs by lengthening expected job search
time. Alternatively, large gross ￿ows may decrease costs by facilitating a thicker market for
services demanded by movers (e.g., the very existence of one-way do-it-yourself rental truck
companies). For departure-destination location pairs, information transmission may make
costs decreasing in the sum over previous gross ￿ows. Such alternative frictions are unlikely
to be completely orthogonal to net ￿ows, and therefore they may very well modify local
growth dynamics. Even so, it seems quite reasonable to believe a ￿net￿ friction proportional
to net population ￿ows will remain. Again it is worth emphasizing that the numerical results
below include calibrations with ￿very small￿ labor mobility frictions.
I model the labor mobility friction as a utility cost proportional to the net ￿ow rates
in both the departing and receiving locality. Letting arrows represent the direction of net
migration, the utility cost can be formalized as,
Ucost
































The second set of equalities follows from the largeness assumption about row.6
Modeling the labor friction as a utility cost rather than a wealth cost is done for an-
alytical tractability. A wealth cost proportional to net ￿ows will eﬀect nearly identical
dynamics as long as it rises at the rate of exogenous technological progress, for instance if
costs were proportional to real wages.7 Indeed, the utility cost is calibrated based on the
6The ￿ow out of or into row is just the negative of the ￿ow into or out of i,a n dLrow is an order of
magnitude greater than Li;a sl o n ga s
d




7Assuming a wealth cost which rises at less than the rate of exogenous technological progress, labor
mobility increases with time.
11relative wealth needed to induce a one percent rate of net migration. The only diﬀerence
between a utility-based friction and a wealth-based friction is that under the former, indi-
viduals have the same asset wealth both prior to and after migrating whereas under the
latter, individuals have a lower asset wealth after migrating. Assuming a wealth cost to net
migration would actually increase the labor mobility friction in the sense that a larger labor
wealth diﬀerential would be needed to induce any given rate of net migration.
In an equilibrium, the ￿ow between i and row must be such that the marginal migrant be
indiﬀerent between migrating or not. This will be the case when the utility cost associated
with migrating exactly equals the incremental lifetime utility associated with living in the
destination location. De￿ning dUi(t) as the utility diﬀerential associated with living in i,
dUi (t) ≡ Ui (t) − Urow(t)








While all agents in both i and row a r ea s s u m e dt ob ei d e n t i c a lw i t hr e g a r d st ot h e i r
inherent characteristics (there are no high-skilled or low-skilled individuals), where they
may diﬀer is with regards to their asset wealth; moreover this is a diﬀerence that they
retain should they choose to migrate. Let dUi(t) > 0 so that there is a positive utility
diﬀerential associated with living in i and hence a net migration ￿ow from row to i.T h e
largeness assumption on row obviates the need to distinguish between marginal and average
migrants (i.e., row has a suﬃcient number of residents with any given asset wealth level
that all time-t migrants can be assumed to be identical). A ￿marginal migrant￿ from row
into i is assumed to have asset wealth equivalent to the contemporary mean in i.A s a l l
residents in i are assumed to start with identical asset wealth prior to any shocks, the same
de￿nition works when there is a net ￿ow from i to row.
Consistent with Tiebout￿s (1956) hypothesis that migration sorts a heterogenous popu-
lation into more homogenous sub-populations, migration in the present case sorts individuals
according to their asset wealth. A possible justi￿cation is that in the real world, zoning
laws place limits on the quantity of housing services that individuals can buy; having the
same asset wealth as current residents, in-migrants desire the same quantity of housing
services.8 Note that in an important sense this assumption of Tiebout wealth sorting binds:
8More problematic is reconciling such a zoning explanation with the modeling of in-migrants as raising
12the lower an individual￿s asset wealth, the greater their utility gain for a given increase in
labor wealth.9 And so when utility is (temporarily) higher in i than in row due to higher la-
bor wealth, it is those individuals in row with the lowest asset wealth who have the greatest
incentive to migrate.
The main result emphasized herein ￿ the insensitivity of the speed of income conver-
gence to the degree of labor mobility ￿ does not depend on such Tiebout wealth sorting.
Driving the insensitivity result is the disincentive eﬀect on gross capital formation caused
by the exit of labor from low-capital-intensity localities; this exit occurs regardless of the
speci￿c assumption made with respect to the asset wealth of migrants. Nor does the history
dependence of steady-state population density discussed below depend on Tiebout wealth
sorting. So long as local residents can use asset wealth to smooth their consumption, local
steady-state population density will depend on the history of local shocks. (Also see Ap-
pendix B.) Given the homothetic speci￿cation of individual utility, alternative assumptions
on the asset wealth of migrants could be handled in a straightforward manner.10
In contrast, the nature of the history dependence (as opposed to its existence) closely
depends on the assumed asset wealth of migrants. Such fragility suggests attaching little
importance to the speci￿cs of the history dependence described below.11
The utility diﬀerential associated with living in i relative to row can be decomposed
aggregate demand for housing services thereby causing current residents to decrease their housing-service
consumption (but not expenditure).




> 0 as labor wealthi
>
< labor wealthrow.
10Assuming that migrants are those with asset wealth who stand to bene￿tm o s tf r o mag i v e nm o v e
should strengthen the disincentive eﬀect of labor mobility on gross capital formation. Following a negative
capital shock (described below), out-migrants will be those local residents with the lowest asset wealth and
hence the lowest housing consumption. Because low-asset-wealth migrants ￿free up￿ less housing than do
migrants with mean asset wealth, a larger cumulative out￿ow should be needed to cause housing prices to
fall suﬃciently to eﬀect a return migration. Return migrants will be characterized by high asset wealth and
high housing consumption so that a smaller cumulative in￿ow should be needed to cause housing prices
to return to their original level. As the value of installed capital is directly proportional to current and
future population levels, both the larger out￿ow and the smaller in￿ow should further dampen gross capital
formation.
11The scenario in the previous footnote ￿reverses￿ the characteristics of the new steady state: a negative
capital shock causes a decrease in steady-state population density due to an increase in steady-state asset
wealth.
13using (6b) where each of the right-hand-side terms is de￿ned analogously to dUi(t):
dUi (t)=d Uwealth,i (t)+d Uprice,i (t)( 1 6 )
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The quotient in (17a) captures the relative wealth of a potential migrant between i and
row. As discussed above, migration implies a change only in labor wealth with asset wealth
remaining the same.
3.6 Dynamics
The dynamic system can now be expressed as a system of seven diﬀerential equations in
{Li(t), b ki(t), d assetsi(t), qK,i(t), dUwealth,i(t), dUprice,i(t), d valuei(t)}.T h e￿rst three of these,
{Li(t), b ki(t), and d assetsi(t)}, ￿ are ￿state￿ variables which are instantaneously ￿xed (i.e.,
they can not ￿jump￿). The remaining four, {qK,i(t), dUwealth,i(t), dUprice,i(t), and d valuei(t)},
are ￿co-state￿ variables which can jump, but only in reaction to unexpected system shocks.
The dynamic system is mutually recursive with respect to all of the variables with the
exception of d valuei(t); none of the remaining system variables depends on the evolution of
d valuei(t) and so it could be dropped from the system without further loss of information;
I retain d valuei(t) because it maps to a key local observable. The actual expressions for the
diﬀerential equations are deferred until Appendix A.
Any remaining endogenous variables can be calculated from the contemporary values
of these seven system variables along with the various exogenous parameters.
3.7 Local Steady State
The local steady state can be derived by setting each of the seven system diﬀerential equa-
tions just discussed, (A.1a) ￿ (A.1g), equal to zero and solving for the state and co-state
variables. The actual expressions are again deferred until Appendix A. The steady-state
values of two of these, {b ki(t), qK,i(t)}, are determinate in that they can be expressed as
a function of exogenous parameters alone. The remaining ￿ve system variables, {Li(t),
14d assetsi(t), dUwealth,i(t), dUprice,i(t), and d valuei(t)}, collectively have one degree of freedom
in the sense that in addition to the exogenous parameters, the steady-state value of one of
these needs to be known to determine the steady-state values of the other four.
The ￿extra￿ degree of freedom results from the fact that the overall system is subject
to history dependence. For the intuition on how this arises, consider two localities, i and j,
identical in all exogenous parameters, but having a diﬀerent history of local development.
In particular, at some point in the distant past i experienced a ￿helicopter drop￿ of installed
physical capital. At this same point in the distant past, j experienced an ￿artillery drop￿
which destroyed a large portion of its installed capital base. (Thankfully, no one was
injured.) The steady-state levels of labor income will be identical between the two localities.
But during the transitions to their respective steady states, i￿s residents have high current
relative to permanent income whereas j￿s residents have low current relative to permanent
income. Consumption smoothing leads i￿s residents to accumulate but j￿s residents to
decumulate asset wealth during the transition to the steady state. It immediately follows
that in these steady states, i￿s residents have a higher asset wealth than j￿s residents. While
the steady-state price of housing services will be identical between the two localities ￿ if
not, there would be an incentive to migrate ￿ the higher asset wealth of i￿s residents means
that they will be purchasing a higher steady-state quantity of housing services. With equal
aggregate ￿ows of housing services, this can only be if the population of i is smaller than
that of j.
The story should illustrate that the one degree of freedom with respect to the sys-
tem variables in no the way implies that there is any possibility of ￿choice￿ over steady
states (other than altering the exogenous parameters). On the contrary the system is fully
determined; it is just that this determination is based both on the ￿static￿ exogenous pa-
rameters as well as the history of local shocks. Individuals￿ consumption smoothing serves
as the underlying mechanism.12
But the story also illustrates that the nature of the history dependence is somewhat
perverse: a ￿good￿ shock causes an economy￿s steady-state population to fall whereas a
￿bad￿ shock causes an economy￿s steady-state population to rise. Here, the key underlying
mechanism is the assumed inelastic supply of housing services. With local size as measured
12So one way to remove such hysteresis would be to allow individuals to insure against geographically-based
shocks.
15by housing stock ￿xed, local size as measured by population depends primarily on local
income distribution. And local income distribution, in turn, depends primarily on modeling
assumptions for which there is no obvious choice (e.g., the asset wealth of migrants, integer
constraints on housing quantity consumption, the possibility of bidirectional gross labor
￿ows). As mentioned above, the close dependence on assumptions of the nature of the
hysteresis suggests attaching little importance to it. But such fragility does not extend to
the existence of the hysteresis, a result which is robust across a wide range of assumptions.
4 Factor Mobility and Income Convergence
Numerical solutions to the local growth system richly characterize the time paths of popu-
lation, income, and housing prices following a negative shock to a locality￿s capital stock.
The speed at which income converges back towards its steady state turns out to depend
mostly on the degree of capital mobility (i.e., the capital installation friction) and is rela-
tively insensitive to the degree of labor mobility. This qualitative result is robust across a
wide range of calibrations.
A ￿negative capital shock￿ is meant to connote any set of circumstances which leaves
a locality with a low installed capital base relative both to the remainder of an integrated
macroeconomy and to its own steady-state level. Literally interpreted, negative capital
shocks might correspond to natural and man-made disasters. More metaphorically, negative
capital shocks might correspond to changes in technology or the terms of trade which
disproportionately aﬀect the installed capital base of some localities relative to others but
which do not fundamentally alter long run relative productivity: for instance, changes in
manufacturing techniques in steel production on certain areas of the Midwest United States
during the early 1980s.
4.1 Representative Time Paths
Figure 1 sketches the time paths of population, wages, land prices, and the speed of income
convergence following a shock to a locality￿s capital stock which leaves wages at 60 percent
of their steady-state level. Immediately following the shock (at time 0), population begins
to rapidly ￿ow out of the locality (Panel A). The decrease in local wages causes both the
sales and rental price of land to discretly jump downward; following the shock the rental
16price of land continues to fall driven by the out￿ow of population (Panel C). Not shown is
the large in￿ow of gross capital stock that the negative capital shock induces (due to an
increase in the the marginal revenue product of capital and hence its shadow value). The
population out￿ow and the capital in￿ow both tend to increase wages; higher wages along
with lower housing service prices eventually reverse the population out￿ow. As population
￿ows back into the locality, gross capital formation remains suﬃciently positive to allow
wages to continue to converge back towards their steady-state level. The sales and rental
price of housing services also gradually return to their steady-state levels.
As laid out in the theory section above, the local growth system is characterized by
history dependence. Following a negative capital shock, consumption smoothing causes
individuals to decumulate assets. Along with the assumption of Tiebout wealth sorting,
this decumulation implies that locality per capita asset wealth will be lower in the new
steady state. As lower per capita asset wealth implies lower per capita demand for housing
services, steady-state equilibrium in the land market requires a higher population than was
p r e s e n tp r i o rt ot h ei n c o m es h o c k .F o rt h eb a s ec a l i b r a t i o ns h o w ni nF i g u r e1 ,i m m e d i a t e l y
following a negative capital shock, population ￿ows out of the locality at a 3.5 percent
annual rate. From an initial level of exactly 1, population reaches a nadir of 0.858 after 12
years. Population returns to its original level approximately 54 years after the initial shock
and continues to rise eventually reaching 1.058 in the new steady state. Per capita asset
wealth in the new steady state is 0.447 of its pre-shock level (normalized for the level of
labor-augmenting technology).
Wages rapidly converge to their pre-shock level. Immediately following the shock, the
population out￿ow combined with the gross capital in￿ow combine to cause wages to grow
at an 8.3 percent annual rate.13 In less than 6 years they have returned to 80 percent
of their steady-state level; in just over 12 years they have returned to 90 percent of their
steady-state level; and in approximately 40 years they have returned to 99 percent of their
steady-state level. Note that at this 40-year benchmark, population and land prices remain
substantially below their pre-shock levels (which for population applies a fortiori to its level
relative to its new steady state).
Panel D illlustrates that the speed of income convergence as measured by the rate at
13Note that here and below, wages are measured relative to their row level which implicitly normalizes
them by the level of labor augmenting technology.
17which income closes the log gap to its steady state varies considerably along the transition
path. It steadily drops from Λ =0 .163 immediately following the capital shock to Λ =0 .114
after 10 years, Λ =0 .057 after 40 years, and Λ =0 .040 asymptotically. Measured at points
based on income￿s distance to the steady-state rather than at points based on time elasped
since the capital shock, the speed of convergence falls from Λ =0 .163 when wages are at
60 percent of their steady-state level to Λ =0 .097 when wages are at 95 percent of their
steady-state level to Λ =0 .057 when wages are at 99 percent of their steady-state level to
Λ =0 .040 at the steady state itself (i.e., within an † neighborhood of it).
While a decreasing speed of convergence commonly characterizes neoclassical growth
systems, in general the rate at which the speed falls oﬀ is decreasing as income approaches
its steady state (i.e., the speed has a negative ￿rst but positive second derivative with respect
to income). In the present case, a negative second derivative of convergence speed as income
increases implies that the speed of convergence can vary considerably even in a neigborhood
quite close to the steady state. For calibrations with lower labor mobility than in Figure
1, the speed of convergence drops from rates near Λ =0 .09 when wages are at 99 percent
of their steady state to less than Λ =0 .01 at the steady state itself. Indeed, measuring the
speed of convergence only at the steady state, the local growth system appears to achieve a
calibration that has proved elusive for the neoclassical growth model: a narrow capital share
along with a low steady-state shadow value of capital and a slow speed of convergence; but
examining the speed of income convergence at income levels more than negligably below
the steady state, the slow speed of convergence disappears.
A varying speed of income convergence along with history dependence of the steady
state turn out to be generic properties of growth systems with multiple state (i.e., ￿non-
jumping￿) variables. For a growth system to be globally stable, the dimensionality of the
steady state plus the dimensionality of the transition path to this must sum to the number
of state variables. A steady state with dimensionality one or greater corresponds to history
dependence. And Appendix B shows that for a transition path with dimensionality two or
greater, even a linearization implies a varying speed of convergence (a similar point is made
by Eichner and Turnovsky, 1999).
Given the way it varies, Λ(•) does not prove a very useful measure of convergence
speed. Instead I will use wage levels at various benchmark times and the time to reach
various benchmark wage levels as my main comparison metrics.
184.2 Base Calibration
The representative time paths sketched in Figure 1 derive from a single calibration of a model
with a large number of exogenous parameters. In exploring the qualitative robustness of
the time paths with respect to variations in the levels of these exogenous parameters, a
natural starting point is to try to choose ￿base￿ parameter values that allow the model to
approximately match real world observables.
In general I have used parameter values which are the same as in Barro and Sala-i-
M a r t i n( 1 9 9 5 ) .A se n u m e r a t e do nt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo fF i g u r e1 ,t h e s ei n c l u d et h ec a p i t a l
depreciation rate, δ =0 .05, the rate of time preference, ρ =0 .0 2 ,a n dt h er a t eo fe x o g e n o u s
technological progress, x =0 .02.
Barro and Sala-i-Martin include two parameterizations of the capital share, α.A￿rst
narrow capital share parameterization, α =0 .30, corresponds to a literal interpretation
of physical capital and approximately matches the share of national income accounted
for by rental income, pro￿ts, and interest payments. Within a traditional neoclassical
growth framework, a narrow capital share parameterization is associated with a speed of
convergence that tends both to be ￿too high￿ and to decline rapidly as income approaches
its steady state. A partial solution to both problems comes from assuming a broad capital
share, for instance α =0 .75, corresponding to a more metaphorical interpretation of capital
to include human capital. The solution is only partial, ￿rst because a broad concept of
capital implies investment rates somewhat higher than we actually observe and, second,
because a decreasing speed of convergence remains in the open-economy version of the
neoclassical model (King and Rebello, 1993; Rappaport, 2000).
For the purposes of local growth theory, a broad capital share is especially problematic.
To the extent that broad capital is interpreted as human capital, the appropriate friction
would be the labor rather than the capital friction: that is that a qualitatively important
diﬀerence between physical and human capital is the mobility of the latter. Even so, it is
possible to argue for a broader share of ￿xed capital in output production than is implied
b yt h en a t i o n a li n c o m ea c c o u n t s .O n ep o s s i b i l i t yi st h a te s t i m a t i n gt h ec a p i t a ls h a r eu s i n g
factor income fails to account for tax-￿nanced public-sector capital (to the extent that
it was debt-￿nanced, the associated interest payments would contribute to the implied
capital share). Another possibility is that human capital is in part locality-speci￿cs ot h a t
its adjustment may be more appropriately modeled by the capital rather than the labor
19friction. In the alternative calibration section below, I will consider the case of a moderately
broad capital share, α =0 .60.
Unique to the local growth model is a parameter capturing the share of consumption
expenditure devoted to housing services. A 20 percent housing share, ζ =0 .20, roughly
matches the correponding ￿gure from the U.S. national income accounts. As housing ser-
vices proxy more generally for local nontradable goods (and to the extent that local housing
prices may contribute to the ￿nal price facing consumers for locally sold tradable goods),
this housing share is meant to be conservative. The main eﬀect of raising the housing share
parameter is to dampen the response to the capital shock. In the limit as the housing share
approaches 1, the capital shock elicits no outmigration response (i.e., the rental price of
housing services falls to exactly the level which allows individuals to continue to consume
the same quantity of housing services). Alternatively, in the limit as the housing share
approaches zero, capital deepening fails to elicit a reverse migration back to the locality.
Given the motivating question, how does factor mobility aﬀect income convergence,
the parameters which are inherently of the most interest are those that govern the capital
installation and net migration frictions ￿ bK and bL. As a starting point, I map these
friction parameters to more intuitive measures of mobility. In particular, for given rates of
depreciation and exogenous technological progress, the capital friction maps one-to-one with
the steady-state shadow value of capital, q∗
K. Similarly, for a given rate of time preference,
t h el a b o rf r i c t i o nm a p so n e - t o - o n ew i t ht h er e l a t i v ew e a l t hn e c e s s a r yt oi n d u c eao n ep e r c e n t
annual rate of net migration, ω;f r o m( 1 5 )a n d( 1 7 a ) ,ω =e x p( 0 .01 • ρ • bL).
Aggregate empirical timeseries suggest that the shadow value of capital tends to re-
main relatively close to one (Summers, 1981; Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers, 1993). Even
without labor mobility, however, neoclassical growth models calibrated with steady-state
shadow values of capital near one tend to have implausibly high rates of income conver-
gence. For instance, in the closed-economy analog to the local growth model (i.e., with no
labor mobility and with local savings ￿nancing local investment), a steady-state shadow
value of capital q∗
K =1 .14 implies a steady-state speed of income convergence Λ =0 .091.
In the open-economy version of the model (i.e., with no labor mobility but with the ability
to borrow and lend at an exogenous interest rate), it implies a steady-state speed of income
convergence Λ =0 .175. While the closed-economy convergence rate is consistent with some
recent panel-data estimates (Islam, 1995, Caselli, LeFort, and Esquival, 1995), the open-
20economy convergence rate is not. To make matters worse, predicted convergence rates tend
to be much higher for countries with incomes even moderately below their steady-state
levels (i.e., the speed of convergence is falling into the steady state as discussed above).
The eﬀect of labor mobility on convergence speed when there is ￿high capital mobility￿ is
pursued as an alternative calibration below.14 15
To allow for slower income convergence, I choose for a base calibration, a higher steady-
state shadow value of capital, q∗
K =1 .56. This level of capital mobility is consistent with
empirical estimates by Barnett and Sakellaris (1998). Using panel data on ￿rms over the
period 1960 to 1987, they report a median average value of installed capital, q =1 .23
which rises to q =1 .79 after adjusting for investment tax incentives. Even so, the speed
of convergence as measured at the steady state in traditional neoclassical growth models
remains somewhat high (Λ =0 .067 and Λ =0 .093 for the closed- and open-economy
versions, respectively). Hence the alternative calibrations section below also considers the
case of a considerably higher steady-state shadow value of capital, q∗
K =3 .24 (which implies
closed- and open-economy steady-state speeds of convergence Λ =0 .048 and Λ =0 .059).
For benchmarking the labor mobility parameter, the background section above outlines
a number of reasons to believe that traditional empirical estimates of the migration response
to current income diﬀerentials may greatly understate labor mobility. That it takes on the
order of a 25 percent real wealth premium to induce a 1 percent rate of net migration within
an integrated macroeconomy (such as the United States in the late 20th century) does not
seem plausible.
An alternative approach which suggests that labor is indeed highly mobile is proposed
by Gallin (1999). He focuses on the migration response to diﬀerences in current wages while
controlling for diﬀerences in future labor wealth by including expected future migration.
Such an approach allows the coeﬃcient on current wages to be interpreted as the migration
response to the implied diﬀerence in labor wealth; in other words, it is straightforward to
14The speeds of convergence in this and the next paragraph are based on a narrow capital share, α =0 .30,
a unitary elasticity of intertemporal substitution (which matches the implicit assumption in the local growth
model), and the remaining parameter values enumerated in Figure 1.
15Rappaport (2000) shows that introducing an aggregate average installation cost which is convex increas-
ing with respect to gross investment allows the open-economy version of the Ramsey model to be calibrated
to achieve both a steady-state shadow value of capital very close to one as well as a slow speed of convergence
even at income levels substantially below the steady state.
21calculate the ratio of local to row labor wealth implied by a given ratio of local to row wages
which lasts for one period only. Depending on the assumed real interest rate, Gallin￿s
baseline estimate implies that it takes from a 0.3 percent to a 1.0 percent labor wealth
premium to induce a 1 percent rate of net migration. Actual labor mobility may be even
higher as Gallin does not control for variations in quality of life.16
Consistent with Gallin￿s estimates, I assume a ￿base￿ level of labor mobility such that
a 1 percent real wealth diﬀerential is suﬃcient to induce a 1 percent annual rate of net
migration (ω =1 .01). In the subsection which follows, I explore the eﬀects of varying ω to
capture levels of labor mobility both much higher and much lower than the base calibration.
The arguably ￿high￿ labor mobility of the base calibration (e.g., relative to the Barro and
Sala-i-Martin estimates) along with the inclusion of an alternative calibration with even
much higher labor mobility underlies the claim in the previous section that the friction
proportional to the net population ￿ow rate need only be ￿very small￿.
4.3 Alternative Calibrations: The Eﬀect of Factor Mobility on Income
Convergence
Finally, then, to directly address the question, how does factor mobility aﬀect income con-
vergence? Figure 2 shows the time paths of population, gross capital stock, wages, and
land prices following a negative capital shock under alternative ￿high￿ and ￿low￿ labor
mobility calibrations. In the high labor mobility regime just a 1/8 percent diﬀerence in real
wealth will induce a 1 percent annual rate of net migration (ω =1 .00125); under the low
labor-mobility regime an 8 percent diﬀerence is needed to do the same (ω =1 .08). In terms
of the labor friction parameter, bL, the high regime has 64 times the mobility of the low
regime. All other parameters are the same as in Figure 1.
Unsurprisingly, the rate of population out￿ow immediately following the capital shock
is much greater under the high labor mobility regime than under the low one; the respective
initial rates of outmigration are 15.9 percent versus just 0.6 percent (Figure 2 Panel A).
With high labor mobility, population eventually drops to a minimum 68 percent of its initial
16Including expected future migration should be able to control for future diﬀerences in quality of life.
But in the present case, Gallin proxies for expected migration using actual future migration instrumented
by predicted employment growth based on industry shares. To the extent that such an instrument fails
to capture quality-of-life attributes, expected migration will be that arising from productivity-based wealth
diﬀerences only.
22level 7 years after the shock. With low labor mobility, the population out￿ow continues
for a longer period but is much shallower; a minimum population 97 percent of its initial
level is reached 16 years after the shock. With high labor mobility, the return population
￿ow is also much more rapid and by year 46, population under the high regime comes to
exceed that under the low regime. But greater asset deccumulation implies that in the ￿nal
steady state, the low labor mobility regime will have the higher population. (The second
intersection of the population loci is not shown as it takes place more than 100 years after
the initial shock.)
Labor out￿ows drive down the marginal revenue product of capital with the result that
gross capital formation is slower under high than under low labor mobility; immediately
following the negative capital shock, the respective annual rates of gross capital formation
are 20.4 percent versus 25.9 percent (Figure 2 Panel B). 10 years after the negative capital
shock, extensive capital stock normalized for the level of technology is 10 percentage points
lower with high labor mobility than with low labor mobility (i.e., the vertical gap between
the loci); after 20 years the diﬀerence is 12 percentage points. From a post-shock level 18
percent of its pre-shock level, it takes 15 years for extensive capital to reach 80 percent of its
pre-shock level with high labor mobility but just 10 years to do so with low labor mobility.
The inverse correlation of labor and capital ￿ows following capital shocks implies a
substitutability between labor and capital mobility. For a given level of capital mobility,
increases in labor mobility and hence population ￿ows are associated with decreases in gross
capital formation (Table 1 column 4 moving down across rows within a given panel); for a
given level of labor mobility, increases in capital mobility and hence gross capital formation
are associated with decreases in population ￿ows (Table 1 column 3 moving down across
panels for a given row).
In terms of the speed at which income converges back to its long run steady state, the
higher initial out￿ow of population with high labor mobility contributes to a positive eﬀect
of labor mobility on income convergence; the higher growth rate of extensive capital with
low labor mobility contributes to a negative eﬀect of labor mobility on income convergence.
Figure 2 Panel C shows the combined eﬀect. Immediately following the capital shock, wages
grow faster with high labor mobility than with low; the initial growth rates are 0.109 versus
0.080, respectively. After 10 years, wages have returned to 89.9 percent of their pre-shock
level with high labor mobility versus 86.5 percent of their pre-shock level with low labor
23mobility (the vertical gap between loci). For wages to reach 90 percent of their pre-shock
level takes 10.1 years with high labor mobility versus 13.0 years with low labor mobility
(the horizontal gap between loci).
Table 1 Panel B summarizes speed of convergence measures for alternative levels of
labor mobility under the base calibration capital share of production, α =0 .30, and shadow
value of capital, q∗
K =1 .56. The remaining panels show the eﬀect of varying labor mobility
on the speed of income convergence under alternative calibrations of the shadow value of
capital and capital share of production. Note that within a panel, each row represents a
halving of the labor mobility friction relative to the row above; the top row shows the speed
of convergence measured in a corresponding neoclassical, open-economy model in which
population is assumed ￿xed.
What is surprising is the extent to which the time paths of wages under high versus
low mobility remain quite close to each other. So for the base calibration in Table 1 Panel
B, moving from the second row, where a 32 percentage point wealth diﬀerence induces
a 1 percent rate of net migration, to the last row, where just a 1/16 percentage point
wealth diﬀerence is needed to do the same, the relative wage 10 years after the negative
capital shock increases from 0.863 to 0.903; the time until wages reattain 90 percent of
their steady-state level decreases from 13.2 years to 9.6 years. Such changes would seem
qualitatively small when compared with the more than thousand-fold increase in the labor
mobility friction. The speed of income convergence is especially insensitive to increases in
labor mobility from low levels. Moving down from the top row, in which labor mobility is
completely absent, to the low labor mobility calibration in the fourth row is associated with
virtually no change in the various speed of convergence measures, the one exception being
the asymptotic speed of convergence which again emphasizes that it is a misleading metric.
Measured at a point closer to the steady state, the speed of income convergence actually
slows with increasing labor mobility. For instance, under the base capital mobility and
capital share calibration, 20 years after the capital shock relative wages are 0.955 with the
base labor mobility but only 0.953 with high labor mobility. Similarly, the time it takes
for wages to reattain 99 percent of their steady-state level continually increases from 37.3
years under the low labor mobility calibration to 40.7 years under the base calibration to
47.4 years under the high labor mobility calibration (Table 1 Panel B, columns 12 and 16).
Figure 3 Panel A plots the relative wage 10 years after the negative shock against
24increasing levels of labor mobility. The horizontal axis is denominated such that each
horizontal unit corresponds to a halving of the labor mobility friction. The three loci
correspond to ￿low￿, ￿base￿, and ￿high￿ levels of capital mobility with steady-state shadow
values of capital equal to 3.24, 1.56, and 1.14 respectively (corresponding to Table 1, Panels
A through C). That the loci are positively sloped captures that the speed of convergence
as measured by relative wages 10 years after the shock is indeed increasing with labor
mobility. That the loci are relatively ￿at captures that the eﬀect of labor mobility on
income convergence is relatively small. Measured at points closer to the steady state (for
instance, t = 40), the loci are negatively sloped (i.e., the speed of convergence is inversely
correlated with labor mobility).
In contrast to labor mobility, the degree of capital mobility exerts a powerful in￿uence
on the speed of income convergence. Figure 3 Panel B plots the relative wage 10 years after
the negative capital shock against increasing levels of capital mobility. The horizontal axis
is scaled such that each horizontal unit corresponds to a halving of the capital installation
cost. Except at very high levels of capital mobility, the wage level is steeply increasing as
the capital installation cost decreases. For the base level of labor mobility (ω =1 .01), a
halving of the capital installation cost such that the steady-state shadow value of capital
decreases from q∗
K =1 .28 to q∗
K =1 .14 is associated with an increase in the 10-year relative
wage from 0.911 to 0.946. And regardless of the time at which they are measured, relative
wages are always increasing with the degree of capital mobility.
An alternative illustration of the relationship between income convergence and factor
mobility is captured by the vertical gaps between loci in Figure 3, Panels A and B. In Panel
A, each locus represents a quadrupling of the capital friction relative to the locus above
it; the vertical gaps represent the diﬀerence in relative wages 10 years after the negative
capital shock for various levels of labor mobility. In Panel B, each locus represents an
eight-fold increase of the labor friction relative to the locus above it; here the vertical gaps
represent the diﬀerence in relative wages ten years after the shock for various levels of
capital mobility. That the vertical gaps are much greater in Panel A than in Panel B (even
though the diﬀerence in relative frictions between adjacent loci is twice as geat in Panel
B) captures that the speed of income convergence is much more sensitive to variations in
capital mobility than it is to variations in labor mobility.
In general, labor mobility proves a weak substitute for capital mobility but capital
25mobility proves a powerful substitute for labor mobility. The horizontal gaps between loci
in Figure 3 Panel B capture the increase in capital mobility needed to oﬀset the eight-fold
decrease in labor mobility between adjacent loci. To oﬀset a decrease in labor mobility
from ω =1 .01 to ω =1 .08 requires only a very small increase in capital mobility (i.e.,
to maintain the same 10-year relative wage). For the four-fold decrease in capital mobility
between adjacent loci in Panel A, there is no increase in labor mobility suﬃcient to maintain
the same 10-year relative wage.
Figure 3, Panels C and D parallel Panels A and B except that they measure the speed
of convergence by the time it takes for wages to reattain 90 percent of their steady-state
level. The speed of convergence so measured again proves relatively insensitive to the degree
of labor mobility but highly sensitive to the degree of capital mobility. Measured to relative
wages closer to the steady state, the loci in Panel C are positively sloped (e.g., Table 1
Column 16).
Within the current framework, the insensitivity of the speed of income convergence
to the degree of labor mobility is an extremely robust qualitative result. Even under the
parameter calibration eﬀecting the highest sensitivity (low capital mobility with high labor
mobility), the increase in convergence speed brought about by an increase in labor mobility
is minimal. Under the narrow capital share, low capital mobility calibration, tripling the
labor mobility from its base level results in less than a 4 percentage point diﬀerence in
wages 10 years after the (forty-percentage-point) income shock and virtually no diﬀerence
in wages 20 years after the shock. The same increase in labor mobility shortens the time for
wages to reattain 90 percent of their steady-state level by only 2.3 years (from 17.9 to 15.6)
and actually increases the time it takes for wages to reattain 95 percent of their steady-state
level (Table 1, Panel A; Figure 3, Panel A, bottom locus; Figure 3, Panel C, top locus).
As the low capital mobility calibration corresponds to a shadow value of capital far larger
than empirical estimates, such numbers suggest a modest upper bound on the real world
potential contribution of labor mobility to convergence speed.17 18
17Another reason for choosing a relatively low capital friction is the possibility of capital reallocation from
capital-intensive to labor-intensive tradable good production in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework. Following a
negative capital shock, such reallocation contributes to factor price equalization and so is analogous to a
faster capital in￿ow.
18The combination of a broad capital share with a high capital friction does eﬀect a larger contribution
of labor mobility to the speed of income convergence (Table 1, Panel D). However, as one of the main
26From a welfare perspective, the numerical results show that local residents￿ utility
immediately following a negative capital shock is strictly increasing in the level of labor
mobility. Thus the higher relative wages during the early part of the transition path dom-
inate lower relative wages during the latter part of the transition. In addition, the greater
out￿ow of population with high labor mobility causes a greater decrease in the price of
local housing services thereby increasing real (as opposed to output denominated) wages.
Of course to the extent that local housing is owned by local residents (the model assumes
absentee landlords), the lower housing service prices associated with high labor mobility
would contribute to losses in local asset wealth. Whether such an ￿asset wealth￿ eﬀect
of labor mobility is suﬃc i e n tt oc a u s ew e l f a r et ob e c o m ed e c r e a s i n gi nt h el e v e lo fl a b o r
mobility awaits the extension of local growth theory to explicitly incorporate local housing
ownership.
5 Conclusions
Extending the neoclassical growth model to allow for labor mobility shows that the dis-
incentive eﬀect of population ￿ows on gross capital formation roughly oﬀsets the direct
eﬀect of population ￿ows on income convergence. The resulting insensitivity of the speed
of income convergence to labor mobility is extremely robust to alternative assumptions and
parameterizations. And so to the extent that the world economy is becoming more inte-
grated, it seems unlikely that increased labor mobility will increase the rate at which poor
countries catch up to rich ones. More relevant may be the concern that in a world slightly
more complicated than modeled above, increased labor mobility may actually slow income
convergence due to emigration from poor economies of indivduals with high levels of human
capital.
Rather than labor mobility, capital mobility serves as the key determinant of the speed
of income convergence. The result suggests that policies seeking to develop the poorer
regions of large economies focus on lowering the frictions to capital formation.
At a more basic level, the model￿s varying convergence speed and history dependence
illustrate that the neoclassical framework can capture a rich set of phenomenon heretofore
motivations for using a broad capital share calibration is to avoid using a high capital friction calibration,
this latter example would not seem relevant. With the combination of a broad capital share and a low
capital friction, the insensitivity result holds (Table 1,P a n e lF ) .
27largely the preserve of models underpinned by stronger assumptions. Neoclassical growth
theory still has much to teach us.
Appendices
A Local Growth Equations of Motion and Steady-State Levels
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e bK ≡ 2(x + ρ + δ)+( x2 + δ

















K,i =1+( x + δ)bK (A.2d)
dU∗
wealth,i =0 ( A . 2 e )
dU∗























B Convergence with More than One State Variable: Some Algebra
Two key characteristics of the dynamic model are, ￿rst, that its steady-state is not uniquely de-
termined but rather depends on history; and second, that the speed of convergence ￿ the rate at
which income and population approach their steady-state levels normalized by their distances from
their respective steady-state levels ￿ varies greatly, even in a neighborhood quite close to the steady-
state. It turns out that both properties, history dependence and a varying speed of convergence, are
generic with multiple state (i.e., ￿non-jumping￿) variables. The ￿proof￿ lies mainly in pointing out
the necessity of an N-dimensional surface to span an N-dimensional space. That is, to assure that
some steady state can be reached from any feasible starting-value combination of state variables, the
dimensionality of possibly multiple steady states plus the dimensionality of the transition surface to
each of these must sum to the number of state variables.
A steady state with dimensionality one or more is equivalent to history dependence. Such
history dependence is more common than is often believed. Barro (1979) shows there is no one
optimal level of government debt; rather, a country￿s optimal debt depends on its speci￿ch i s t o r y
of shocks (i.e., wars, famines, baby booms, natural resource ￿nds, etc.). In two sector endogenous
growth models (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 1993; Caballe and Santos, 1993), the ratio but not the
level of human to physical capital is determinate (the level however is less interesting within an
endogenous growth framework).
The linearization of a transition path with two or more dimensions will always show an in-
creasing speed of convergence: near the steady-state the negative eigenvalue lowest in absolute value
will dominate; as one moves away from the steady-state, the negative eigenvalue highest in absolute
value will dominate. The algebra showing this follows immediately below. That the asymptotic
speed of convergence is given by the negative eigenvalue lowest in absolute value is also pointed out
29by Eichner and Turnovsky (1999). The actual transition path (rather than its linearized approxi-
mation) may show an increasing, constant, or decreasing speed of convergence. A constant speed of
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logz = A(logz)( B . 1 )






ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
logz=log z∗
• (logz − logz∗)( B . 2 a )




ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
log z=log z∗
Let |λf| > |λs| represent two negative eignevalues of J with corresponding eigenvectors vf
and vs, and arbitrary weighting scalars, af and as (￿f￿ is meant to connote ￿fast￿ and ￿s￿, ￿slow￿).
J (afvf + asvs)=−(λfafvf + λsasvs)( B . 3 )
Then the solution to (B.2b) can be written as,
log(z ﬁ z∗) ≈ afvfe−λft + asvse−λst (B.4)













(logz − logz∗)=−λ • (logz − logz∗)




log(z ﬁ z∗)=− λ ﬂlog(z ﬁ z∗)








It is immediately evident that unless either af or as equal zero, λ will diﬀer in its elements and vary




log(z ﬁ z∗) ﬁ log(z ﬁ z∗)








Normalize the eigenvectors so that the ￿rst element of each equals one. Then the speed of convergence
corresponding to this ￿rst element is given by,
λ1 (t) ≈
λfafe−λft + λsase−λst
afe−λft + ase−λst (B.8)
So except in the special case when af or as equal zero, the linearization implies the speed of
convergence for this representative ￿rst element will go from af to as as time goes from negative to
positive in￿nity. If af and as are oppositely signed, it will also asymptote to positive and negative
in￿nity at some intermediate time.
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L*Low  =  1.060
L*High =  1.053
assts*Low  =  0.428
assts*High =  0.491
Figure assumes a shock which reduces
initial physical capital stock such that
income is at 60% of its steady-state level.
Unless otherwise noted, parameters
are the same as in Figure 1.
!w,Low  =  0.080
!w,High =  0.109
Initial Income Growth
Relative Wealth to 
induce 1% Net 
Migration Rate
"Low  = 1.08000
"High = 1.00125   
Endogenous Results
Initial Net Migration
!L,Low  = -0.006
!L,High = -0.159
!K,Low  =  0.259
!K,High =  0.204
†   In Panel B, gross capital stock is normalized




#*Low  =  0.014
#*High =  0.054
Figure 2: High Versus Low Labor Mobility and Income Shocks
Minimum Population 
Density
Lmin,Low  =  0.966
Lmin,High =  0.680
Exogenous Parameters




ValueLow  =  0.936
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